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I. Introduction
During the ten years before the Globe Financial Crisis, the most common framework employed in
Macroeconomics had incorporated price/wage rigidity into the DSGE models. We developed a basic
medium-scale NK model following Sims,E.(2017, Course notes,A New Keyesian Model with price
stickiness). Currently, the extensions of these models are employed extensively by governmental
sectors to conduct policy analysis. The pioneering medium scale DSGE models are Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans(2005,JPE) and Smets and Wouters(2007,AER).
Traditional New Keyesian model is mainly used for analyzing the impact of monetary policy.
However, in our model, we focus on not only Monetary Policy the Taylor Rule), but also scal
policy, including procyclical government expenditure, value-added tax, capital gain tax, and labor
income tax policies.
The main characters of our model are:
1. Physical capital accumulation
2. Price stickiness
3. Wage stickiness
4. Backward indexation of non-updated prices and wages
5. Habit formation in consumption
6. Investment adjustment costs
7. Variable capital utilization
8. A xed cost of production
9. Monetary policy conducted according to a Taylor rule
10. The following scal policies:
a Governmental consumption spending
b Added value tax
c Progressive labor income tax
d Progressive capital rent tax
11. The following shocks:
a Productive
b Marginal eciency of investment
c Governmental expenditure
d Added value tax
e labor income tax
f capital rent tax
g Monetary policy
h Intertemporal preferences
i Intratemporal preferences(labor supply)
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II. Labor Union
Erceg, Henderson and Levin(2000) used Calvo pricing assumptions. The other studies using
the wage and price stickiness properties include: Ravenna(2000), Sbordone(2002), Christiano, E-
ichenbaum and Evans(2005), etc. In labor market, we use l 2 [0; 1] to represent the dierent labor
services. Labor union receive labor services. Then, we aggregated the various labor supply.
Aggregate labor supply function:
Nd;t =
Z 1
0
Nt(l)
w 1
w dl
 w
w 1
; w > 1 (1)
where, Nd;t is the homogeneous labor input available for production. Nt(l) is the dierentiated
labor supply by household l in period t.
The parameter w shows the elasticity of substitution among dierent labor service. We assume
that the elasticity is large than 1 to ensure that there exists substitutability among dierent labor
services. Based on this, labor union maximizes its prot:
max|{z}
Nt(l)
Wt
Z 1
0
Nt(l)
w 1
w dl
 w
w 1
 
Z 1
0
Wt(l)Nt(l)dl (2)
In the equation, Wt is the aggregated nominal wage, Wt(l) denotes the nominal wage of labor
l. the Labor demand of household is represented by the FOC.
Wt
w
w   1
Z 1
0
Nt(l)
w 1
w dl
 w
w 1 1 w   1
w
Nt(l)
w 1
w
 1  Wt(l) = 0
) Nt(l) =

Wt(l)
Wt
 w
Nd;t
(3)
so we can derive an aggregate wage:
WtNd;t =
Z 1
0
Wt(l)Nt(l)dl =
Z 1
0
Wt(l)

Wt(l)
Wt
 w
Nd;tdl
)W 1 wt =
Z 1
0
Wt(l)
1 wdl
)W 1 wt =
Z 1
0
Wt(l)dl
1 w (4)
Total labor supplied by household:
Nt =
Z 1
0
Nt(l)dl
) Nt =
Z 1
0

Wt(l)
Wt
 w
Nd;tdl =
Z 1
0

Wt(l)
Wt
 w
dlNd;t
(5)
Dening sticky wage diusion index
vwt =
Z 1
0

Wt(l)
Wt
 w
dl (6)
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so we can derive the equilibrium condition of labor market
Nt = Nd;tv
w
t (7)
If Nt > 1, then aggregate labor demand in rms will be less than the aggregate labor supply in
households, which means the wage stickiness can distort the labor market.
III. Household
We assume that the utility of household is composed of consumption and leisure (also known
as the negative utility of labor), household has consumption habit and capital. Household income
is composed of labor income, capital income, dividend from rms, and interest income from bonds.
Household decides the consumption level, the bond-holding level, and the investment label. They
also decide the degree of capital utilization and the supply of capital service. Because the labor ser-
vices can be dierentiated, they have some bargaining power in the labor market. The households'
problem can expressed as:
max
Ct;It;Wt(l);ut;Kt+1;Bt+1
E0
1X
t=0
tvtfln(Ct   bCt 1)   tNt(l)
1+
1 + 
g (8)
where, Ct is the consumption level. ut is the intension of capital utilization. Kt is the capital
stock. Bt is bond.  is the intertemporal discount rate. vt is intertemporal preference shock. b
captures the persistence of habit formation.  t is intratemporal preference (labor supply) shock.
Budget constraint for household:
(1+ ct )Pt(Ct+It)+Bt+1+
~Bt+1 = (1 nt )Wt(l)Nt(l)+(1 kt )PtRtKtut+t PtTt+(1+it 1)Bt (9)
, where  ct ; 
n
t ; 
k
t are changeable VAT rate, labor income tax, and capital gain tax, separately;
It is the investment; Pt is the aggregate price level; Tt is the lump-sum tax; t is the dividend from
corporation; Rtandrt are the real interest rate for capital and bonds.
Dene the capital service supplied by households:
K^t = Ktut (10)
Household accumulation of capital:
Kt+1 = Zt
"
1  
2

It
It 1
  1
2#
It + (1  (ut))Kt (11)
Zt is the investment shock.  is the parameter to adjust the investment cost.  is the deprecation
rate. It is a function of the capital utilization rate:
(ut) = 0 + 1(ut   1) + 2
2
(ut   1)2 (12)
As mentioned above, household chooses the optimal consumption, investment, capital utilization
rate, capital service, bonds and wage level. We divide the household decision into two parts: rst,
non-wage decision, which includes consumption, investment, capital utilization rate, capital service,
and bonds; second, wage decision.
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Step 1: Non-wage decision:
Lagrangian condition:
L =E0
1X
t=0
t(vt ln(Ct   bCt 1) +   
+ t[  + (1  kt )PtRtKtut +t   PtTt + (1 + it 1)Bt
  (1 +  ct )Pt(Ct + It) Bt+1] + t[Zt[1 

2
(
It
It 1
  1)2]It
+ (1  (ut))Kt  Kt+1])
where, t is the Lagrangian multiplier for budget constraint. It is dened by t = Ptt; t is
the Lagrangian multiplier for capital accumulation. It is dened as t = Ptt
First order condition for consumption:
@L
@Ct
=
vt
Ct   bCT 1   bEt
vt+1
Ct+1   bCt   (1 + 
c
t )Ptt = 0
) t = 1
(1 +  ct )

vt
Ct   bCT 1   bEt
vt+1
Ct+1   bCt
 (13)
First order condition for Bond holding:
@L
@Bt+1
=  t + Ett+1(1 + it) = 0
) t = Ett+1(1 + t+1) 1(1 + it)
(14)
where, 1 + t+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
.
First order condition for Capital Utility:
@L
@ut
=t(1  kt )RtKt   t0(ut)Kt = 0
) t(1  kt )RtKt = t0(ut)Kt
(15)
First order condition for Investment:
@L
@It
=  t(1 +  ct ) + tZt(1 

2
(
It
It 1
  1)2   ( It
It   1   1)
It
It 1
) + Ett+1Zt+1(
It+1
It
  1)(It+1
It
)2 = 0
)  t(1 +  ct ) = tZt(1 

2
(
It
It 1
  1)2   ( It
It   1   1)
It
It 1
) + Ett+1Zt+1(
It+1
It
  1)(It+1
It
)2
(16)
First order condition for Capital accumulation:
@L
@Kt+1
=  t + Et(t+1(1  kt+a))Rt+1ut+1 + t+1(1  (ut+1))) = 0
) t = Et(t+1(1  kt+1))Rt+1ut+1 + t+1(1  (ut+1)))
(17)
Step 2: Optimal decision on household wages setting. Supposing that household de-
termines the wage level based on Calvo pricing assumption. In each period, each household has
a probability of 1   w to adjust the wage and a probability of w to not adjusting the wage.
This means that overall, 1  w shares of household in the society can adjust their wage while w
5
percentage of household cannot adjust the wage. It is worth noted that for the households who
could not adjust their wage, their wage would still be upgraded by the ination index from the
last period. In other words, the nominal wage for the households who could not adjust their wage
could be determined by (1 + t 1)wWt 1(l), where w is the lagged ination rate, Wt 1(l) stands
for the nominal wage in the last period. Hence, the nominal wage of a household l in period t is:
Wt(l) =
(
W t (l); ifWt(l)beoptimallychosen
(1 + t 1)wWt 1(l); otherwise
(18)
where, W t (l) is the optimal wage. After households have already chosen the optimal wage level,
which is Wt(l) =W

t (l), households would not adjust the wage in the following period. Their wage
would only be upgraded by the ination index. This means,
Wt+1(l) = (1 + t)
wW t (l)
Wt+2(l) = (1 + t+1)
wWt+1(l) = ((1 + t+1)(1 + t))
wW t (l)
  
Wt+s(l) = (1 + t+s 1)wWt+s 1(l) =
0@s 1Y
j=0
(1 + t+j)
1Aw W t (l)
where 0@s 1Y
j=0
(1 + t+j)
1Aw = Pt
Pt 1
Pt+1
Pt
   Pt+s 1
Pt+s 2
=
Pt+s 1
Pt 1
the wage that could not be adjusted at t+s time could be expressed as:
Wt+s(l) =

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
w
W t (l) (19)
The Lagrangian for household wage setting:
L = Et
1X
s=0
(w)
s( vt+s t+sNt+s(l)
1+
1 + 
+ t+s((1  nt+s)Wt+s(l)Nt+s(l) + :::))
= Et
1X
s=0
(w)
s( vt+s t+s
0@ Pt+s 1Pt 1 wW t (l)
Wt+s
! w
Nd;t+s
1A1+
1 + 
+ t+s((1  nt+s)

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
w
W t (l)
0B@

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
w
W t (l)
Wt+s
1CA
 w
Nd;t+s + :::))
The FOC is :
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@L
@W t (l)
= Et
1X
s=0
(w)
s(  vt+s t+s

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
 ww(1+)
W
w(1+)
t N
1+
d;t+s( epsilonw)W t+s(l) epsilonw(1+)
+ t+s(1  nt+s)

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
w(1 w)
W wt+sNd;t+s(1  w)W t (l) w) = 0
) wW t (l) w(1+)Et
1X
s=0
(w)
s(vt+s t+s

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
 ww(1+)
W
w(1+)
t+s N
1+
d;t+s
= (w   1)W t (l) wEt
1X
s=0
(w)
st+s(1  nt+s)

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
w(1 w)
W wt+sNd;t+s
Simplifying further, we have:
W ?t+s(l)
1+ww =
w
w   1
h1;t+s
h2;t+s
(20)
where :
h1;t = Et
1X
s=0
(w)
s(vt+s) t+s

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
 ww(1+)
W
w(1+)
t+s N
1+
d;t+s (21)
h2;t = Et
1X
s=0
(w)
st+s(1  nt+s)

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
w(1 w)
W wt+sNd;t+s (22)
dening real wage by wt =
Wt
Pt
. Then h1 and h2 can transfer to:
h1;t = Et
1X
s=0
(w)
s(vt+s) t+s

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
 ww(1+)
w
w(1+)
t+s P
w(1+)
t+s N
1+
d;t+s (23)
h2;t = Et
1X
s=0
(w)
st+s(1  nt+s)

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
w(1 w)
wwt+sP
w
t+sNd;t+s (24)
Using real Lagrangian multiplier to exchange for the nominal h2:
h2;t = Et
1X
s=0
(w)
st+s(1  nt+s)

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
w(1 w)
wwt+sP
w 1
t+s Nd;t+s (25)
Now we write h1;t; h2;t recursively:
h1;t = vt tw
w(1+)
s P
w(1+)
t N
1+
d;t+s + wEt

Pt
Pt 1
ww(1+)
h1;t+1 (26)
h2;t = t(1  nt )wwt P w 1t Nd;t + wEt

Pt
Pt 1
w(1 w)
h2;t+1 (27)
Dene h^1;t =
h1;t
P
w(1+)
t
; h^2;t =
h2;t
P w 1t
. In term of ination rates, we get
h^1;t = vt tw
w(1+)
t N
1+
d;t+s + w(1 + t)
ww(1+)Et(1 + t+1)
w(1+)h^1;t+1 (28)
h^2;t = t(1  nt )wwt Nd;t + w(1 + t)w(1 w)Et(1 + t+1)w 1h^2;t+1 (29)
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So, dene w?t =
W ?t
Pt
Result of rst order condition of wage setting:
(w?t )
1+w =
w
w   1
h^1;t
h^2;t
(30)
Dene h1;t =
h^1;t
(w?t )
w(1+)
. So we can get
h1;t = vt t (fracwtw
?
t )
w(1+)N1+d;t+s + w(1 + t)
ww(1+)Et(1 + t+1)
w(1+) h^1;t+1
(w?t )
w(1+)
= vt t (fracwtw
?
t )
w(1+)N1+d;t+s + w(1 + t)
ww(1+)Et(1 + t+1)
w(1+) h^1;t+1
(w?t+1(
w(1+)
(w?t+1)
w(1+)
(w?t )
w(1+)
= vt t (fracwtw
?
t )
w(1+)N1+d;t+s + w(1 + t)
ww(1+)Et(1 + t+1)
w(1+)h1;t+1
(w?t+1)
w(1+)
(w?t )
w(1+)
(31)
Dene h2;t =
h^2;t
(w?t )
w . So we can get
h2;t = t(1  nt )

wt
w?t
w
Nd;t + w(1 + t)
w(1 w)Et(1 + t+1)w 1
h^2;t+1
(w?t )
w
= t(1  nt )

wt
w?t
w
Nd;t + w(1 + t)
w(1 w)Et(1 + t+1)w 1
h^2;t+1
(w?t )
w
(w?t+1)
w
(w?t )
w
= t(1  nt )

wt
w?t
w
Nd;t + w(1 + t)
w(1 w)Et(1 + t+1)w 1h2;t+1
(w?t+1)
w
(w?t )
w
(32)
Then we get
w?t =
w
w   1
h1;t
h2;t
(33)
IV. Firm
The production of goods could be split into two types: nal goods production and intermediate
goods production. Intermediate rms (or wholesale goods products) produce dierent types of
goods which are imperfect substitutes (at the origin of the monopolistic competition). Final rms
(or retailers) produce an homogeneous good by combining intermediate goods in a CES technology.
Because of imperfect substitutes of the intermediates in nal production process, the intermediate
rms have the pricing power. The intermediate goods rms produce output using labor and capital
service and subject to an aggregate productive shock. They follow the Calvo's pricing rule as well.
A. Final Goods Firms
The nal products are a CES form of a continuum of intermediate goods:
Yt = (
Z 1
0
Yt(j)
p 1
p dj)
p
p 1 ; p > 1 (34)
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where, Yt is the output of the nal goods rm; Yt(j) is the output of the intermediate j; p is
the institute elastic between various intermediate products.
The prot maximization of the nal products rm reads as:
max|{z}
Yt(j)
PtYt  
Z 1
0
Pt(j)Yt(j)dj
max|{z}
Yt(j)
Pt(
Z 1
0
Yt(j)
p 1
p dj)
p
p 1  
Z 1
0
Pt(j)Yt(j)dj
) F:O:C: : Pt p
p   1(
Z 1
0
Yt(j)
p 1
p dj)(
p
p   1   1)
p   1
p
Yt(j)
( p   1
p
  1) 
Z 1
0
Pt(j)dj = 0
) Pt( Yt
Yt(j)
)(
1

)  Pt(j) = 0
Then, we can get the demand of intermediary goods:
Yt(j) = (
Pt(j)
Pt
) pYt (35)
where, Pt is the aggregate price index; Pt(j) is the price of the intermediate good j.
The aggregate price index:
P
1 p
t =
Z 1
0
Pt(j)
1 pdj (36)
B. Intermediary Goods Firms
Intermediate producers have the following production technology:
Yt(j) = AtK^t(j)
Nd;t(j)
1  (37)
here At is the productivity of the intermediates that faced a common TFP shock. K^t(j) is the
demand of capital service in the intermediate rm j.  is the share of capital service in the output.
As the intermediary goods are dierentiated, the rms have some level of market power. So,
the optimal strategy for a intermediary goods rm j can be separated into two steps:
First step: Given the level of productivity, cost can be minimized by changing the investment
and labor:
min|{z}
K^t(j);Nd;t(j)
RtK^t(j) + wtNd;t(j)  (AtK^t(j)Nd;t(j)1    Yt(j))
) F:O:C: :
Rt = AtK^t(j)
 1Nd;t(j)1 
wt = (1  )AtK^t(j)Nd;t(j) 
Combining the FOC conditions, we can get:
wt
Rt
=
1  

(
K^t
Nd;t
) (38)
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Note that this equation no longer relies on the intermediary goods rms j, this is because the
optimal input elements of all the intermediary goods rms are the same.
The marginal cost:
mct =
wt
(1  )At( K^tNd;t )
(39)
Second Step: Intermediary goods rms can maximize the prot by adjusting price. We assume
that the intermediary goods rms uses Calvo price-setting, which means that a 1  p percentage
of rms can set the price at its optimal level P ?t (j), the rest p percent of rms cannot set the price
at its optimal level but can upgrade the price at a velocity of p according to last period ination.
Pt(j) =
(
P ?t (j); ifPt(j)beoptimallychosen
(1 + t 1)pPt 1(j); otherwise
(40)
Similar as the way that household adjust the wage, intermediary goods rms adjust their price
by:
Pt+1(j) = (1 + t)
pP t (j)
Pt+2(j) = (1 + t+1)
pPt+1(j) = ((1 + t+1)(1 + t))
pP t (j)
  
Pt+s(j) = (1 + t+s 1)pPt+s 1(j) =
0@s 1Y
j=0
(1 + t+j)
1Ap P t (j)
, where 0@s 1Y
j=0
(1 + t+j)
1Aw = Pt
Pt 1
Pt+1
Pt
   Pt+s 1
Pt+s 2
=
Pt+s 1
Pt 1
Meanwhile, at time t+ s, the price of the intermediary goods rms that cannot adjust the price
can be upgraded by:
Pt+s(j) =

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
p
P t (j) (41)
Based on this, we consider the prot maximization for the intermediary rms:
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max|{z}
Pt(j)?
Et
1X
s=0
(p)
s ^t+s
^t
[Pt+s(j)Yt+s(j)  Pt+smct+sYt+s(j)]
) max|{z}
Pt(j)?
Et
1X
s=0
(p)
s ^t+s
^t
[

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
p
P t (j)
0B@

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
p
P t (j)
Pt+s
1CA
 p
Yt+s
  Pt+smct+s
0B@

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
p
P t (j)
Pt+s
1CA
 p
Yt+s]
) max|{z}
Pt(j)?
Et
1X
s=0
(p)
s ^t+s
^t
[

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
p0B@

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
p
Pt+s
1CA
 p
Yt+sP

t (j)
1 p
  Pt+smct+s
0B@

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
p
Pt+s
1CA
 p
Yt+sP

t (j)
 p ]
The FOC is:
) (p   1)P t (j) pEt
1X
s=0
(p)
s ^t+s
^t

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
p0B@

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
p
Pt+s
1CA
 p
Yt+s
= pP

t (j)
 p 1Et
1X
s=0
(p)
s ^t+s
^t
Pt+smct+s
0B@

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
p
Pt+s
1CA
 p
Yt+s
) P t (j) =
p
p   1
Et
P1
s=0(p)
s ^t+s
^t
Pt+smct+s
 
Pt+s 1
Pt 1
p
Pt+s
! p
Yt+s
Et
P1
s=0(p)
s ^t+s
^t

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
p  Pt+s 1Pt 1 p
Pt+s
! p
Yt+s
Optimal pricing strategy through Lagrangian:
P ?t =
p
p   1
X1;t
X2;t
(42)
where,
X1;t = Et
1X
s=0
(p)
s^t+sPt+smct+s
0B@

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
p
Pt+s
1CA
 p
Yt+s
X2;t = Et
1X
s=0
(p)
s^t+s

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
p0B@

Pt+s 1
Pt 1
p
Pt+s
1CA
 p
Yt+s
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Because of t = Pt^t; 1 + t =
Pt
Pt 1 , dene x1;t =
X1;t
P
p
t
; x2;t =
X2;t
P
p 1
t
, so we write the conditions
recursively as:
x1;t = tmctYt + p(1 + t)
 ppEt(1 + t+1)px1;t (43)
x2;t = tYt + p(1 + t)
 p(p 1)Et(1 + t+1)p 1x2;t (44)
Dene 1 + ?t =
P ?t
Pt 1 , then
1 + ?t =
p
p   1
x1;t
x2;t
(1 + t) (45)
V. Central Bank
Taylor's rule of Monetary Policy:
it = (1  i)i+ tit 1 + (1  )[(t   ) + y(lnYt   lnYt 1)] + si (46)
VI. Department of Finance
(1)Government spending policy:
lnGt = (1  g) ln(!Yt) + g lnGt 1 + g (47)
where, Gt is governmental real expenditure. ! is the parameter of a sensitivity to the output.
This means that the government expenditure could be positively and endogenously eected by
economic growth. This is supported by the fact that the majority of government expenditure is
procyclical.
Budget constraint for Department of Finance:
PtGt + (1 + it 1)Bt = PtTt +Bt+1 + nt
Z 1
0
Wt(l)Nt(l)dl + 
k
t PtRtKtut + 
c
t Pt(Ct + It) (48)
(2)VAT policy:
 ct = (1  c) c + c ct 1 + c (49)
(3)Labor income tax policy:
nt = (1  n)n + (1  n) ln
wtNd;t
wNd
+ n
n
t 1 + n (50)
(4)Capital rent tax policy:
kt = (1  k)k + (1  k) ln
RtKt
RK
+ k
k
t 1 + k (51)
In most country, labor income and capital income tax are both using progressive tax policy.
Hence, we assume that tax rate is determined progressively. This means that if the income is higher
than steady state level, the tax rate will increase, vise versa.
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VII. Equilibrium and Aggregation
After all markets clear, we get a total resource constraint:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt (52)
We derive the total output function below. We start by integrating the both sides of the
intermediary goods function: Z 1
0
Yt(j)dj =
Z 1
0
AtK^t(j)
Nd;t(j)
1 dj
Put the intermediary demand function into the last equation, we get:Z 1
0
(
Pt(j)
Pt
) pYtdj = At
 
K^t(j)
Nd;t(j)
! Z 1
0
Nd;t(j)dj
Dene vpt =
R 1
0 (
Pt(j)
Pt
) pdj as price diusion index. Then
vpt Yt = K^

t N
1 
d;t (53)
What is vpt ? Recall that we use Calvo pricing strategy, we split the price diusion function into
two parts:
vpt =
Z 1
0
(
Pt(j)
Pt
) pdj
=
Z 1 p
0
(
P ?t
Pt
) pdj +
Z 1
1 p
(1  t 1) pp

Pt 1(j)
Pt
 epsilonp
dj
= (1  p)

1 + ?t
1 + t
 
+ p(1 + t 1) pp(1 + t)pv
p
t 1
(54)
Total price function can also be split to:
P
1 p
t =
Z 1 p
0
(P ?t )
1 pdj +
Z 1
1 p
(1 + t 1)p(1 p)Pt 1(j)1 pdj
= (1  p)(P ?t )1 p + p(1 + t 1)p(1 p)P 1 pt 1
(55)
We add inate rate into the equation:
(1 + t)
1 p = (1  p)(1 + ?t )1 p + p(1 + t 1)p(1 p) (56)
following the Calvo pricing strategy, we split the function of wage change into two parts:
W 1 wt =
Z 1
0
Wt(l)
1 wdl
=
Z 1 w
0
(W ?t )
1 wdl +
Z 1
1 w
(1  t 1)w(1 w)Wt 1(l)1 wdl
= (1  w)(W ?t )1 w + w(1  t 1)w(1 w)W 1 wt 1
(57)
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The real wage:
w1 wt = (1  w)(w?t )1 w + w(1  t 1)w(1 w)(1 + t)w 1w1 wt 1 (58)
VIII. Other Shocks
the productivity shock:
lnAt = A lnAt 1 + A;t (59)
the shock marginal eciency of investment:
lnZt = z lnZt 1 + Z;t (60)
the intertemporal preference shock:
ln vt = v ln vt 1 + v;t (61)
the intratemporal preference(or labor supply) shock:
ln t = (1   ) ln +  ln t 1 +  (62)
IX. Full set of equilibrium conditions
t =
1
(1 +  ct )

vt
Ct   bCT 1   bEt
vt+1
Ct+1   bCt

(63)
t = Ett+1(1 + t+1)
 1(1 + it) (64)
t(1  kt )RtKt = t0(ut)Kt (65)
t(1 + 
c
t ) = tZt(1 

2
(
It
It 1
  1)2   ( It
It   1   1)
It
It 1
) + Ett+1Zt+1(
It+1
It
  1)(It+1
It
)2 (66)
t = Et(t+1(1  kt+1))Rt+1ut+1 + t+1(1  (ut+1))) (67)
h1;t = vt t (fracwtw
?
t )
w(1+)N1+d;t+s + w(1 + t)
ww(1+)Et(1 + t+1)
w(1+)h1;t+1
(w?t+1)
w(1+)
(w?t )
w(1+)
(68)
h2;t = t(1  nt )

wt
w?t
w
Nd;t + w(1 + t)
w(1 w)Et(1 + t+1)w 1h2;t+1
(w?t+1)
w
(w?t )
w
(69)
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w?t =
w
w   1
h^1;t
h^2;t
(70)
wt
Rt
=
1  

(
K^t
Nd;t
) (71)
mct =
wt
(1  )At( K^tNd;t )
(72)
x1;t = tmctYt + p(1 + t)
 ppEt(1 + t+1)px1;t (73)
x2;t = tYt + p(1 + t)
 p(p 1)Et(1 + t+1)p 1x2;t (74)
1 + ?t =
p
p   1
x1;t
x2;t
(1 + t) (75)
Yt = Ct + It +Gt (76)
vpt Yt = K^

t N
1 
d;t (77)
vpt = (1  p)

1 + ?t
1 + t
 
+ p(1 + t 1) pp(1 + t)pv
p
t 1 (78)
(1 + t)
1 p = (1  p)(1 + ?t )1 p + p(1 + t 1)p(1 p) (79)
w1 wt = (1  w)(w?t )1 w + w(1  t 1)w(1 w)(1 + t)w 1w1 wt 1 (80)
K^t = Ktut (81)
Kt+1 = Zt
"
1  
2

It
It 1
  1
2#
It + (1  (ut))Kt (82)
it = (1  i)i+ tit 1 + (1  )[(t   ) + y(lnYt   lnYt 1)] + si (83)
lnGt = (1  g) ln(!Yt) + g lnGt 1 + g (84)
 ct = (1  c) c + c ct 1 + c (85)
nt = (1  n)n + (1  n) ln
wtNd;t
wNd
+ n
n
t 1 + n (86)
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kt = (1  k)k + (1  k) ln
RtKt
RK
+ k
k
t 1 + k (87)
lnAt = A lnAt 1 + A;t (88)
lnZt = z lnZt 1 + Z;t (89)
ln vt = v ln vt 1 + v;t (90)
ln t = (1   ) ln ss+  ln t 1 +  ;t (91)
There are 29 equations with 29 endogenous variables:t; t; Ct; it; t; Rt; ut; Zt; It; vt;  t; wt; w
?
t ;
h1;t; h2;t; Nd;t; K^t;Kt;mct; 
?
t ; x^1;t; x^2;t; Yt; Gt; At; v
p
t ; 
c
t ; 
n
t ; 
k
t :
And the parameters:; b; 0; 1; 2; ; w; ; w; w; ; p; p; p; i; ; y; g; a; z; v;  ss;  ; !;
c; n; k; c; n; k; n; k; target:
X. The steady state
Basically, we have to remove all the time indices (t,t1,t+1, ) on the endogenous and exogenous
variables in all the equations, and express the endogenous variables as functions of the exogenous
variables and parameters. This cannot be done analytically in all models, and often we will have
to resort on a numerical solver to obtain the steady state (for given values of the parameters and
exogenous variables).
To get the steady state for the equilibrium, we rst remove the subscribts t for all the endogenous
variables. In above models, it is possible to obtain an analytical expressions for the steady state of
the most endogenous variables.
1. From monetary policy (83), we can get steady state of ination rate  = target.
2. From the shock function (85) - (91), we can get A = 1; Z = 1; v = 1;  =  ss; 
c = c; 
n =
n; 
k = k
3. From (64), we get i = 1+   1.
4. (ut) = 0+ 1(ut  1)+ 22 (ut  1)2, 0(ut) = 1+ 2(ut  1). In steady state, we assume taht
the capital utility of household is equal to 1.
u = 1 Then, we use the free parameter to calibrate the steady value of capital utilization rate.
From (66), we get (1 +  c) = 
From (65), we get
(1  k)R = [1 + 2(u  1)]
u=1z}|{) R = 1 +  c
1  k 1
(92)
From (67),
 = ((1  k)R+ (1  0))
) R = 1 + 
c
1  k (
1

  (1  0))
(93)
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From (92) and (93), we know that in order to get steady value of capital utilization rate
u = 1, then
1 =
1

  (1  0)
which means, 1 depends on deep parameters ; 0.
5. From (79), we get
(1 + )1 p = (1  p)(1 + ?)1 p + (1 + )p(1 p)p
) ? =
"
(1 + )1 p   p(1 + )p(1 p)
1  p
# 1
1 p
  1
(94)
6. From (78)we get
vp =
(1  p)(1+?1+ ) p
1  p(1 + )p(1 p)
(95)
7. From (73) and (74), we get
(1  p(1 + )p(1 p))x1 = mcY
(1  p(1 + )(1 p)(p 1))x2 = Y
Combining both equations above, we get
mc =
1  p(1 + )p(1 p)
1  p(1 + )(1 p)(p 1)
x1
x2
(96)
Substituting (75) to (96), we get
mc =
p   1
p
1 + ?
(1 + )
1  p(1 + )p(1 p)
1  p(1 + )(1 p)(p 1)
(97)
8. Combining (71) with (72), we can get
mc
R
=
1

 
K^
Nd
!1 
) K^
Nd
=
mc
R
 1
1 
(98)
9. Then, we can get the real wage
w =
1  

 
K^
Nd
!
R (99)
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XI. Appendix List of Dynare Files
This appendix lists the dynare les used in this paper. All les and the data used are contained
in the le Mscale NK2019.zip. In case simulated data was used in the estimation, one rst needs
to run the relevant dynare code to simulate the data, and save it.
 mscale dsge baseline.mod - solves the above NK model and simulates data;
 mscale dsge baseline steadystate.m - solves the steady state values of all endogenous variables;
 mscale dsge baseline running.m - runs the mscale dsge baseline.mod and saves the simulated
data;
 mscale dsge baseline est.mod - estimates the baseline NK model.
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